

Crises Anticipation, Avoidance, Creating...

Decision-making with a short deadline

Emergency decision-making

Urgent problem-solving

Insight: In the major crises, the main risks and limitations have not come from data-collection - transmission capabilities, or from organization, or from staff failures, or from "misunderstandings" (between opponents (of facts, intended messages, attitudes) (as often distinct from disagreements or conflicts)).

Critical area is the decisions, judgments, role performance (asking questions, evaluating plans, definitions and estimates, authorizing risky info gathering, evaluating evidence, defining goals) of individuals, both of the contributing organizations, and at the very top, the overall performance, their direction, rather than the

Problem is not to replace them by "managers".  
Our political system precludes that; it gives  
them, and their immediate appointees, responsibility and  
authority, and stakes their jobs and reputations on  
performance; they are, moreover, interested in  
national security.

Yet: they are amateurs;

creating opportunity encouraging fair people.

Desire of opponents to avoid or at least  
postpone military involvement or trouble — known to  
public — pending an election.

This may make an opponent reluctant to take  
trouble coming to acknowledge a need for  
forestalling or preempting action (which would  
raise the issue in public eyes, create apprehension,  
cause questions about Admin's assurances), thus  
making surprise + unreadiness more likely.

But actual facts may be a challenge to  
action however unambitious.

Also, Admin that expects to be replaced may  
be reluctant to move. (After 1960: English move.)

E.t., errors made by those planning a surprise,  
last example, leaving them vulnerable to counter-attack:

- 1) Underestimation of effects of causing anger by destruction.  
[Hammurabi & Bay of Pigs;] Khrushchev and Kennedy (like in Bay of Pigs).  
Provocation, escalation of moves; "provoking" responses.
- 2) Heavy blatant encourages commitment (threats, provocation - commitment of prestige - lack of preparation, immediately provoked).

3) Costs/risks of overestimating scale of operations, preparations.

Combined

[In both Bay of Pigs and Cuban crisis, the military were represented in the Colonel only by the Chairman of the Rev was this enough?]

Costs/risks of limiting staff, internal criticism.

• Possible force, speed, real nature of counteraction,  
to opposite "provoked" sufficiently.



To enlarge sample of "crises," break down  
crises into "Acts," sub-crises.

e.g. list surprises; show which lead to

1) counter-surprises

2) violent action

3) retreats

4) acceptance

e.g. How "crisis" set off

Possibility of "Slow Crisis": to minds - Cuba? &

Important

a) Deadline (not necessarily "short" see d)

b) Problem-solving

c) Deadline short relative to the difficulty of  
solution, time "normally" required to accomplish

solution (with normal procedures, organization & etc.)

or through processes of estimating, planning, etc.

as far as the resource challenges that extraordinary  
and sudden behavior is required.

Factors that make surprise more achievable by  
opponent:

a) Intell. analysts ignorance of political or  
technical factors inhibiting fact or effective response

the belief that opponent "would be sure of prompt,  
effective response — so wouldn't try." Carter

should not be taken as example of "OK, he made a  
big mistake — well, never right — he won't try it

again" (Kent?) ignoring factors (including wrong  
beliefs: US intentions?) that could have validated  
wrong expectations.

b) Underestimate enemy's ability for secrecy.

" " " willingness to deceive (e.g. Israel).

" " " speed of deployment, cooperation

(US didn't understand this in Iraq)

All of these figured in all of the surprises, and  
all of the setbacks.

(Did they underestimate risks ahead, ~~with~~  
advantages of stopping; underestimate costs of stopping  
(Else it says: thought they had taken most of Canal;  
+ of failure?)

2) Pressures that can be brought to bear.  
— support is lost, by public (English in Iraq)  
gov opposition, (Iraq, Bay of Pigs), Allies (US in Iraq  
enemy (US in Cuba; SC in Iraq)

3) Humiliation, demoralization + fear of anger, loss of  
moral superiority, as result of disruption of  
public + allies, as well as enemy (all of whom were  
angry at being deceived + being made fools of by their  
own predictions, commitments).

## "Commitment"

Would underestimating requirements of Kissinger, etc.,  
to risks, allied reactions, collateral damage, etc.  
e.g. by military, intelligence — be enough to  
get Head of State to agree to "small, partial"  
operation which he would then be committed to  
following through, by fear of failure and hope of  
success?

Example of success in this? Counterexamples:

- a) K's retreat in Cuba
- b) British-French retreat in Bay (What was British  
goal? Was it achieved?)
- c) JFK retreat in Bay of Pigs.

(I+R, Bpt 19, 62?)

Military underestimate: 1) Willingness of Head of State to  
accept defeat in face of "worse" consequences. Retreat  
risk of these retreats over-heaty, loss of nerve, head of state  
(What was intent of RFK threat?) — head of state



b) Facts accomplish desired; covert preparations

c) But not covert, "deniable" operations  
guiltless

d) Though, since, fact accomplish, deception, collateral  
damage; desire to minimize collateral damage —

this idea, Bay of Pigs, Oct 14-25 Oct (Saves  
special notions: very subtle;  
didn't contemplate violence?) and others, US feelings; US by 1st,  
US to call them??

this + desire for fact accomplish, limited moves —

dangerously or too dangerously? (Very? Early plans

— October 14-22 Oct?)

Now plans for "precise demonstrations" — international

by Page — a feature of "present crisis", early?

+ in Bay of Pigs — and early plans to "erase mistakes

in Cuba — desire to deny operations?, kept plans

rather small & ineffective but provocative and

limiting.

Faintly accomplished

Bay of Pigs:

1) US sense of deadline: opportunity; May too late.

April certain to work.

2) Handled like crisis: ~~having~~ small number of decision-makers, not because of speed but because of secrecy: 2) clandestine 4) faintly accomplished (bridge against loss of secrecy?)

(British-French at Cannes at Bay; US on Oct 14; SU on Cuban missiles:

2) Flecting opportunity crises

① "Provocation," <sup>examination of legal means</sup> US elections

② sense of small mistakes, justified by SU deception,

covered by SU secrecy = deception, before large deployment.

SU movement, SAMs operational (Was this

a factor in urgency?); or, sense of <sup>(weakness?)</sup>

offensive blockade, before everything had arrived;

invasion, before AFCMs, 196Ms operational

③ Last chance for move to make a difference, before AFMs appeared; US elections? SS-7s?

McNaughton: Jorensen's first draft of Pers speech:

"These missiles make no difference to the military situation; but you can't treat the US that way." But there were too many people in the US who would have said, "If that's all that's involved, it'd just as soon be a second class power" (Allies).

Relation between prestige/reputation/percept of Head of State/Adm and the nation's influence and security. [But you get force, violence, radical action when you threaten both; if you ~~can~~ manage to ~~then~~ threaten or but other side without humiliating or threatening internal position of other, you're much safer.]



[Note to President, Kennedy]

Task? Provide new decision-makers with the relevant secret history they could not have learned in school, or in RAND, or in State, or in other jobs: etc.

Help them understand their previous, outside "lessons" of "crisis decision-making."

Provide them with true nature of past decision-making, instead of relying entirely on "on-the-job training" like the Bay of Pigs. e.g. interagency disputes.

[Did the have early crises, 1952-54? ~~any~~ he was experienced?]

What lessons does Johnson still need?]

Trouble: "everybody knows" past crisis history!

Note dangers of preconceptions, lack of offhand conversation.

Security requires independence for real problems, involving

ideas of problems, in new initiatives; and system fails

to provide them an education. Teaches techniques, not values

(Identify the key jobs that give a real role in

crisis decision-making; e.g. ~~the~~ President!)



Perspectives on intell. effort concealed by clearances

- 1) Large
- 2) Frequent
- 3) Selective; focused
- 4) acceptance of cost, time, expense.
- 5) Given focus & model: <sup>being</sup> reliable, unimpaired, timely.
- 6) Organized
- 7) Controlled at top.
- 8) a major concern of high level decision-makers
- 9) a major area of conscious, concealed interaction between
- 10) continuous, pervasive influence on decision-making

[Contrast: public view, including "elite outsiders"]

[Ideology: clandestine activities?]

2 for 63

A revised BNSF has been reviewed & approved by the JCS and submitted to the SecDef for approval. [SEC]

This revision includes significant changes in national level strategic thinking. These changes deal primarily with increased emphasis on our nonmilitary posture, on flexible & selective responses, both overseas & at home, to the entire spectrum of the Comm threat, and on continuing ops.

Def: GW: Armed conflict between the major powers of the Communist & Free Worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

LW: Armed conflict short of GW, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two nations.

Incidents: Brief clashes or other military disturbances generally of a transitory nature & not involving protracted hostilities.

Free World: Those countries not under communist control, domination or influence.

C 33 March 63

That: Sov leaders evidently believe that their  
current strategic forces provide a strong  
deterrent ~~to~~ against Western initiation of GW  
and are sufficient to support an aggressive foreign  
policy, particularly by virtue of the threat they pose to  
Allies of the US in Europe & Asia.

[i.e. SU... has capability of launching large scale initial  
attacks on short notice against a large number of European  
targets & a lesser number of North American targets.  
However, the SU cannot at present time save any  
assurances that it could escape destruction from  
Western attacks even if the USSR struck first.]

Sov can be expected to continue their aggressive  
actions and their military preparations.  
Presently, there is an implication in Sov behavior  
that they consider themselves in a position to attack  
the West deliberately or to undertake local moves if  
either of these actions carry with them a serious risk  
of bringing on GW. This does not mean, however, that they  
would always estimate the risk correctly nor does it mean  
that they would abandon interests they considered vital.

in order to avoid grave risk of nuclear war.  
These views do not exclude the use of available street  
forces to launch a pre-emptive attack should they  
conclude that the West is irreversibly committed to  
an imminent attack or that, through unforeseen situations,  
there is posed an unacceptable threat to their vital interests.

As regards (large & theater field forces) as a part of  
the deterrent to GW and as essential to the conduct of  
GW, should it occur, also regard these forces as  
a deterrent to any limited action against G.W. territory or  
its periphery while during <sup>at the same time</sup> as an essential means of  
maintaining comm. regions in the satellites.

d. The maintenance of large conventional forces permits the  
G.W. to engage in either limited or local actions in Eurasia.  
However, in the view of the two leaders, GW acquisition  
carries some danger of expanding into GW. This danger  
may be great or small depending on the issues at stake  
in the conflict. The two leaders view the issue of the  
G.W. as a major factor in the balance of power.



The Lvs are probably convinced that in a C.W. between themselves & the West, this risk would be grave. Therefore, they probably would involve themselves militarily only in situations in which they believed that - (1) they would achieve success quickly & could control the risk of escalation, and in which their actions would not threaten vital Western interests; [Cuba?] or, (2) they could disengage in the event of a direct confrontation with the over-all power of the U.S.

c. Although the Lvs are unlikely, as a matter of general policy, to use their own forces to achieve local goals, they might do so in some area adjacent to Rlv territory if they judged that the political circumstances were favorable, and believed that the West would not make an effective military response. They could probably employ Lvs forces as necessary if some Western military action on the periphery of the Rlv threatened its integrity. [Cuba Case]

3/2.

Military, Overall military obj. of the US is to provide  
for the judicious use of military strength as an element  
of national power to achieve US objectives, avoiding  
hostilities as long as such avoidance is compatible  
with US interests, but being prepared to conduct any  
war in a manner designed to further the interests of  
the US and its allies & to defeat the enemy.

Includes the following in achieving this objective the US will:  
EW: to defeat the S-S & bloc case US will...

EW: to defeat the enemy in a manner best calculated to  
bring the war to a conclusion on terms advantageous to the  
US. In achieving this obj, US will:

- 1) Protect the interests of the friendly people involved.
- 2) Enhance Allied solidarity & effectiveness.
- 3) Provide for effective & max. utilization of indigenous forces.
- 4) Discourage future aggressors from repeating the same.
- 5) Control scope & intensity of conflict to minimize cost of escalation.
- 6) Use force.

6) Be prepared to fight locally in direct conflict with S-S & loc forces in order to prevent them with alternatives of disengagement, withdrawal, retreat, or expansion of hostilities. [US force and loc agents to preclude other alternatives]

7) Maintain adequate G.W. posture.

CW: 1) Deter S-S & loc use of armed force by being clearly prepared to win either CW or G.W using weapons & forces appropriate to the situation.

(C+C)

8) Develop & maintain US C+C system & com system which will be promptly responsive under all conditions to governmental decisions as to initiation, regulation and termination of military operations.

## 2nd Group

14. Fundamental US goal is the concept of employment of force provide for conducting military ops on a scale and in a manner which will force the enemy to terminate ops on terms advantageous to the US & its Allies.

Consistent with the strategy, mil. ops will be conducted in a manner which will:

- 1) Subvert determination.
- 2) Apply effective military pressures.
- 3) Provide a wide range & varied degree of alternative military courses of action.
- 4) Permit assumption of the offensive at the earliest practicable moment.
- 5) Minimize damage to the US, its Allies, and noncombatants.
- 6) Make every feasible effort to end the conflict at a nonnuclear level while retaining prepared to use nuclear weapons if required.
- 7) Make every feasible effort to prevent small scale conflicts from escalating into broader conflict. (on C.C.C.)
- 8) Exploit potential of dissident groups & domestic influences.



5. This fundamental US strategy is influenced by the following considerations.

1) The US & its Allies now have an over-all military superiority against which all courses of action ultimately must be weighed. This strength is the source of our greater latitude of action in the complete spectrum of war on a world-wide basis even though we do not equal the S-S Bloc in certain specific categories of mil. cap.

2) The US conventional forces operate in the environment of our over-all posture of power — a fundamental part of which is our nuclear strike capability. Our over-all military effectiveness will be enhanced by making it clear in all nations that our nuclear power is available for use at any time and that we have the will to use this power as required. Thus, the nuclear & non-nuclear forces combine to give the US freedom of action & the opportunity to choose from a variety of courses of actions not open to the S-S Bloc on a world-wide basis.

G.W.

a. GW might result from miscalculation or hostilities about of GW which were not initially intended by either side to lead to GW or, less likely, its might be initiated by the USSR with a nuclear onslaught with little or no warning. [back to p. 176] In response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment, US forces may be required to take the initiative.

b. Detering principle is employment of nuclear weapons is that US must emerge from initial nuclear ops with clear military advantage. No attempt is made to prejudge the length of a G.W. [No "pleases"]

c. Adequate recognition will be given to fact that, even in a 3rd center forces will be required to conduct significant nonnuclear ops to provide for ground, sea & air ops where & when nuclear weapons are either not available at all times or where their use is not militarily required and is not politically feasible. Even under conditions of

of nuclear exchange involving the landwards of the  
US & the USSR, use of nuclear weapons in certain  
specified areas may not be authorized.

(cf. SSOP)

2. Nuclear Ops

Concept. US, under conditions of GW, will launch a  
nuclear strike attack, in accordance with the SIOF

3. Ops subsequent to initial Nuclear Ops [No. 1000]

1) ... will be conducted as provided by JCS, to extent that  
comm & control structure will permit. However, command  
must be prepared, in event of interrupted comm or loss  
of centralized control elements, to continue ops, including  
nuclear, C-3 ops in accordance with approved plans,  
over-all US military objectives [USCP/BSNP] and  
their own analysis of the situation

2) Offensive operations controlled by initial nuclear ops will  
be attempted to defeat remaining enemy military  
forces, to establish free & representative governments over  
Soviet-Soviet & Soviet population, and to attain other US & Allied  
war & post-war objectives.

[US Policy on Conduct of War]



51 Priority of effort for <sup>Western</sup> ops will be in

- Battle  
Central European area.

§ Initial efforts

will be to liberate East Germany + Czechoslovakia. [New?]

In POC, ops continued to defeat comm military forces and

as may be necessary to extend effective Allied control over

certain areas of mainland Asia. Ultimately, the presence

of sufficient Free World forces in East - South East Asia

will be required to effect a measure of control over the

S-S Bloc pop. [?]

## 20. Control & Flex of Resources

a. Survivability enhanced by hardening; dispersal; increasing alert

status; pre-stocking facilities in COMUS & abroad; increased warning time;

improved communications & processing systems [Also CR, CIO, ...]

b. In addition to SIOB options aimed at selective attack on

bases of S-S Bloc power, other selective measures can be

integrated to influence the world-wide situation. It is

recognized that these other [Also options] could be

[Why always <sup>defeat</sup> Sino - Sov Bloc?]



significantly affected by the precision & completion of our info on enemy strength & on the status of C & C facilities surviving a strike nuclear exchange. Accordingly, commanders will include in their plans a concise statement of the risks inherent in the implementation. [S.E.C.]

These courses of action, designed to minimize destruction not directly associated with a specific attack, include:

- 1) Withholding all attacks on certain countries.
- 2) Attacking a restricted category of targets in certain countries, e.g. neutralization of air defenses.
- 3) Correlation of delivery systems used on targets to be ~~defended~~ attacked: e.g. manned aircraft on targets requiring precise delivery; and in other cases missiles used on targets requiring less precision. [There was threat on C.D.]
- 4) Use of B.C. agents as approp.
- 5) Use of O.W. forces "

1) Ensure continued access to strategic areas and guarantee the determination of the US to honor its commitments and respond to aggression with appropriate means.

2) Force inhibit aggression to a level of only military in character when such action is in the interests of the US.

3) Retard aggression in connection with available local forces, to permit necessary augmentation of US

or Allied forces; [e.g. - 3/2-5]

making every possible effort to keep the war at a conventional level, but being prepared to use nuclear weapons if required.

C. Elements of SAC specifically configured & committed for numerical etc. when directed by the JCS.

23. Concept.

2. LW ops will be conducted on a scale and in a manner which reflects that the US will accept the consequences of GW. [?] Ops will be conducted in a manner which will accomplish the desired objectives yet minimize the probability of the enemy expanding the intensity & scope of the conflict.

Non-nuclear ops will indicate our determination and provide the option to engage the enemy forces on a scale of our own choosing before having to decide to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. However, our overall military effectiveness will be enhanced by making it clear in all times that our nuclear power is available for use at any time and that we have the will to use this power as required.



2. When US forces become actively engaged in combat  
also in one area, appropriate action will be taken on  
a world-wide basis to provide for:

- 1) A state of readiness for all forces
- 2) Ops in other areas where our capabilities can bring  
meaningful pressures to bear on the S-S Bloc.

3. Should CW involving the US occur, the US will:

- 1) React swiftly & effectively to neutralize the aggressor. [But...]
- 2) Be prepared to shift & expand the area of conflict  
in such a way that US & Allied strength can be  
applied more effectively
- 3) Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples &  
territories previously kept through communist  
or political aggression. [But...]
- 4) Fight in concert with allies, or unilaterally if necessary



5) Limit damage within the area of conflict,  
consistent with the achievement of military obj.

6) Mobilize resources, as required, and be prepared to  
provide essential assistance to allies involved.

d. Significant limited military ops will be supported  
from US potential capabilities by:

1) Expanding and/or increasing production from the  
prod. base.

2) Minimizing financial limitations.

3) Augmenting from civilian sources, manpower,  
and airlift capabilities.

24. Under Ops

See DOD Air 5105.17 (14 Feb 61), 5105.22

SM - 262-62, SM - 271-61

36. C+C

2. C+C of US forces will be exercised by the  
Pres & the SecDef, through the JCS, by means  
of the W-WMCS.

Continuity of ops. DOD Air No. C 3020.26

CvB. US mil. forces will be prepared to use C+B  
weapons to the extent and use will enhance the  
effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision to  
use C+B weapons will be made by the Pres, except  
for use of smoke, incendiary & riot control agents in  
appropri. mil. ops; 2) riot control agents in suppressing  
civil disorders.

CINCS and CINCPAC (US) authorized to determine time

conditions for employment and to direct military

of the S.

2) Attack & destroy capital & ports of land - slow  
no restriction.

3) Take cognizance of all land policies but to note that  
U.S. views to impose regional or unilateral action  
to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

4) As concern to above, need coordination with  
necessary in order of priority for nuclear weapons  
intelligence are:

a) Reduce engaged enemy military forces.

b) Reduce enemy military power directly supporting  
engaged forces.

c) See in such a manner as to ensure Dis-credit  
attribution that the U.S. is willing to expand the level  
of conflict as necessary.

d) In accomplishing the foregoing:

i. Limit nuclear strikes to military targets

Treat the U.S. as if hostile, and if consistent  
with U.S. policy.